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ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose: This paper examines a detailed case study of Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) customization failure in an Egyptian state-owned company (AML) by drawing on 
new institutional sociology and its extensions.  It explains how ERP customization failure 
is shaped by the interplay between institutionalised accounting practices, conflicting 
institutions, power relations and market forces. 
Methodology/Approach: The research methodology is based on using an intensive case 
study informed by new institutional sociology, especially the interplay between 
conflicting institutions, power relations and market forces. Data were collected from 
multiple sources, including interviews, observations, discussions and documentary 
analysis. 
Findings: The findings revealed that the inability of the ERP system to meet the core 
accounting requirements of the control authorities (the Central Agency for 
Accountability) was the explicit reason cited for the ERP failure. The externally imposed 
requirements of the Uniform Accounting System and planning budgets were used to 
resist both other institutional pressures (from the Holding Company for Engineering 
Industries) and market and competitive pressures. 
Research limitations: There are some limitations associated with the use of the case 
study method, including the inability to generalize from the findings of a single case 
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study, some selectivity in the individuals interviewed, and the subjective interpretation by 
the researchers of the empirical data. 
Practical implications: The paper identifies that the interplay between institutional 
pressures, institutionalised accounting practices, intra-organizational power relations, and 
market forces contributed to the failure to embed ERP in a major company. 
Understanding such relationships can help other organisations to become more aware of 
the factors affecting successful implementation of new ERP systems and provide a better 
basis for planning the introduction of new technologies.  
Originality/value of paper: This paper draws on recent research and thinking in 
sociology, especially the development and application of new institutional sociology. In 
addition, the paper is concerned with ERP implementation and use and management 
accounting in a transitional economy, Egypt, and hence contributes to debate about 
exporting Western accounting practices and other technologies to countries with different 
cultures and different stages of economic and political development. 
Classification:  Research paper/ case study 
 
Key words: Enterprise Resource Planning, Institutionalised Accounting Practices, Egypt, 
New Institutional Sociology. 
 
1. Introduction 
It is often observed that accounting systems and practices are difficult or slow to change 
(Scapens and Roberts, 1993; Burns, 2000; Granlund, 2001; Burns et al., 2003; Lukka, 
2007). It was expected that the introduction of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
systems in 1990s would radically change accounting systems and practices (Chapman 
and Chua, 2000; Sutton, 1999). However, the available evidence is disappointing. It was 
found that ERP systems reinforce rather than change existing accounting systems and 
practices (Granlund and Malmi, 2002; Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003; Quattrone and 
Hopper, 2005). Then, what is the problem with ERP systems? 
 
ERP systems have been criticised for being inflexible and not meeting specific 
organization and industry requirements (Davenport, 1998; Scapens et al., 1998; Booth et 
al., 2000). For instance, Scapens et al. (1998: 48) observed that ‘…the British subsidiary 
of a US multinational, which was implementing SAP world-wide, found considerable 
difficulty in adapting SAP to its operating needs…SAP was configured for the US 
operations and this led to inflexibility for the British subsidiary’. Unlike in-house 
developed legacy systems, ERP systems require the organization to adapt to the software 
rather than modify the software to fit the organization’s established practices (Granlund 
and Malmi, 2002). Davenport (1998: 122), for example, argues that ‘an enterprise 
system, by its very nature, imposes its own logic on a company’s strategy, organization 
and culture’. Thus, it is expected that the implementation and use of ERP systems are 
associated with a problem of misfit, i.e. the gaps between the functionality offered by the 
package and that required by the adopting organization (Soh et al., 2000).  
 
As packaged software, ERP is designed by vendor organizations but used by customer 
organizations, two sets of players who are independent of each other (Soh and Sia, 2004). 
ERP creators inscribe their view of the world in the technology that they create (Latour, 
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1992; Orlikowski, 1992). For instance, Hedberg and Jonsson (1978: 56) argue that ‘[t]he 
way in which organizations’ information (and accounting) systems reflect the world 
depends on the designers’ assumptions about important characteristics of organizations 
and their environments’. The institutional conditions and human actors involved in 
technology design are different from those involved in technology use. As a consequence, 
ERP embodies at least some of the institutional properties of vendor organizations, which 
could be from a different country with different meanings, norms and powers to the 
customer organization. When there are major misfits between the assumptions and rules 
embedded in the ERP and the actual usage, organizations can respond through package 
customization or organizational adaptation. In some cases, both solutions might be 
difficult to implement which then results in the failure of the ERP project, see Figure 1.  
The failure of ERP customization or organizational adaptation means that customer 
organizations continue following their existing (old) systems and practices, where 
stability in organizational systems and practices refers to ‘continuity over time’ (Giddens, 
1979: 199). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: ERP software and the misfit problem  
 
Our case organization (AML) is an Egyptian state-owned company that demonstrates a 
failed attempt to customize an ERP system. In Egypt, a comprehensive economic and 
structural adjustment programme, including a privatisation programme, was started by 
the Egyptian government in the early 1990s. This programme resulted in changes in the 
regulatory environment and created market pressures on our case organization. The 
company was confronted with an organizational change as a result of institutional change 
and market competition that contributed to the ERP customization failure. Given the role 
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of the regulatory environment and market competition in driving the organizational 
change in our case organization, new institutional sociology (NIS) theory and its 
extensions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Modell, 2002) are adopted in this paper to 
explain and understand the ERP customization failure in AML. 
 
The NIS perspective explores the role of macro economic, political and social institutions 
in shaping organizational structures, policies and procedures (Scott, 2001). Organizations 
respond to such external, macro pressures in order to receive support and legitimacy 
(Modell, 2002). NIS has been adopted to explain homogeneity and persistence (Granlund 
and Lukka, 1998; Dacin et al., 2002), ERP package-organization misalignments (Soh and 
Sia, 2004), conflicting institutional pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; D’ Aunno et al., 
1991), the interplay between institutional and market forces (Gupta et al., 1994; Modell, 
2002), and the interplay between institutional pressures and intra-organizational power 
relations (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Modell, 2002; Tsamenyi et al., 2006). This paper 
draws on these recent developments in NIS in the accounting and information systems 
literatures to address the following research question: how is the ERP customization 
failure shaped by the interplay between institutionalized accounting practices, conflicting 
institutions, power relations and market forces? 
     
The remainder of this paper is organised in five sections. In the next section, we articulate 
the theoretical framework based on NIS and its extensions. This is followed by details of 
the research method employed in this study. The paper then discusses how ERP 
customization failure is shaped by the interplay between, institutionalised accounting 
practices, conflicting institutions, power relations and market forces. The final section 
provides a summary of the paper and some conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework: New Institutional Sociology and its Extensions 
In this section, we propose new institutional sociology and its extensions as the 
theoretical framework informing our analysis of the case study. Initially, the concept of 
institutional isomorphism and its relationship with the misfit problem is discussed. Then 
we examine the implications of the interplay between conflicting institutions and intra-
organizational power relations on the one hand, and institutional and market pressures on 
the other hand, for ERP customization failure. As mentioned in the previous section, this 
examination is necessary because ERP customization failure was shaped by the 
institutional forces (institutionalized accounting practices), conflicting institutions, intra-
organizational power relations and market forces. 
 
2.1  Institutional Pressures, the Problem of Misfit and Institutionalised Accounting 
Practices 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) introduce the concept of organizational fields and define it 
as the organizations that constitute a recognized area of institutional life such as 
suppliers, customers and regulatory agencies. They argue that the organizations within 
the field tend to make organizational changes that make them very similar to each other. 
There are three mechanisms through which institutional isomorphic change occurs: 
coercive isomorphism, normative isomorphism and mimetic isomorphism. Coercive 
isomorphism is primarily related to the political influence exerted by institutions on 
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which organizations depend for critical resources and long-term survival, such as the 
state’s laws and regulations. Normative isomorphism is the institutionalisation of social 
practices as a result of professionalisation by means of professional groups. Mimetic 
isomorphism stems from the tendency of organizations to imitate each other in response 
to symbolic uncertainty.     
 
As stated earlier, ERP is packaged software that is designed by vendor organizations and 
is used by customer organizations, two sets of players independently of each other (Soh 
and Sia, 2004). The institutional conditions and human actors involved in technology 
design are different from those involved in technology use. As a consequence, ERP, as a 
semi-finished product1, tends to embody the institutional properties of vendor 
organizations, which might be from a different country with different meanings, norms 
and powers. However, ERP can be configured during implementation to match the 
wishes of the customer organizations. This adaptation process encodes the institutional 
properties of the customer organizations into the software. After the configuration 
process, if there is still a gap between the business processes embedded in the software 
and the existing organizational processes, a decision could be made to change the 
organizational processes to handle certain processes outside the software or to change the 
base code of the software.  
 
Drawing on the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Soh & Sia (2004) identify two 
potential institutional sources of misalignments: externally imposed organizational 
structures and voluntarily acquired organizational structures. Imposed organizational 
structures are institutional structures dictated by authoritative sources in the 
organization’s environment, especially the coercive authority of nation-states such as 
laws and regulations and the more normative authority of professions such as 
professional and industry institutions. Voluntarily acquired organizational structures are 
adopted because of reasons such as the organization’s particular experience and history, 
as well as management preferences. Soh and Sia (2004) argue that organizations 
operating in different countries face different institutional pressures, and will evolve 
different structures. So, if the customer organization of the ERP package is from a 
different country than that of the ERP package’s main markets, there are potential 
misalignments that should be considered. When misalignments exist, organizations can 
respond through package customization or organizational adaptation. The organizational 
responses to these misalignments are the result of a process of interaction and negotiation 
among various parties, including management, users, IS personnel, and consultants.  
 
Soh and Sia’s (2004) framework relates ERP packages to (extra-organizational) macro 
institutional pressures to explain differences in embedded structures in ERP packages and 
organizations. However, the organizational responses to the potential misalignments refer 
to intra-organizational dynamics and processes of change and stability. Burns and 
Scapens’ (2000) institutional framework is primarily concerned with such dynamics and 
processes. This framework overcomes a major limitation of NIS, i.e., the minimal 
                                                 
1 ERP is a semi-finished product with tables and parameters that user organizations and their 
implementation partners configure to their business needs. 
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attention paid to the role of interest and agency in shaping human action. In addition, it 
explains the institutionalization processes of accounting practices. 
 
Our case company, AML, is an Egyptian state-owned enterprise that has adopted 
imposed organizational structures (the Uniform Accounting System and planning 
budgets) in response to the coercive authority of the Egyptian laws and regulations and 
control authorities since 1966 to present. These structures have been institutionalized and 
became potential sources of ERP package – organization misalignments. These 
misalignments contributed to the failure of the ERP project introduced by the company in 
response to the privatization programme in Egypt in the 1990s.  
 
2.2 Institutional Pressures, Conflicting Institutions and Intra-Organizational Power 
Relations   
A major criticism of NIS is related to its relative inattention to the role of pro-active 
agency in constructing institutions (Carruthers, 1995). For example, Barley and Tolbert 
(1997) argue that NIS has largely focused on the role of institutions in shaping and 
constraining the actions of actors. This criticism has been addressed in recent institutional 
studies that focus on the ability of actors to respond to institutional pressures (Oliver, 
1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Burns and Scapens, 
2000; Collier, 2001; Modell, 2002; Tsamenyi et al., 2006). These studies have broadened 
NIS to include power relations.      
 
In this paper, we draw on the work of Burns and Scapens (2000) to study how institutions 
interact with the actions of organizational actors and the role of power relations in their 
interaction. Based on Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory, Burns and Scapens (2000) 
describe the relationship between actions and institutions as the agency-structure 
relationship. They argue that although institutions constrain and shape action at a specific 
point in time, actions produce and reproduce institutions through their cumulative 
influence over time.  
 
Burns and Scapens (2000) adopted the concept of power as articulated by Giddens 
(1984). In this regard, there are two main perspectives of power (Macintosh and Scapens, 
1990). The first perspective is that power is best conceptualised as the transformative 
capacity of an actor to achieve his or her will, even at the expense of others who might 
resist him or her (power in the broad sense). It can be used to introduce new 
organizational rules or may be mobilised to resist such new rules. The second perspective 
is that power should be seen as a property of the society or social institutions or the 
medium for domination (power in the narrow sense). It is the power embedded in the 
institutionalised routines, which shape the actions and thoughts of organizational 
members. In Burns and Scapens’ framework, the two perspectives of power are 
connected together as features of the duality of structure.        
 
Both perspectives of power are of particular interest to this paper. In our case 
organization the decision to adopt an ERP system was mainly taken by the Holding 
Company for Engineering Industries, which has been established according to the Public 
Enterprise Law No. 203 of 1991. Organizational members of AML, especially 
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accountants, resisted this order through mobilizing another power. This refers to the first 
perspective of power. Accountants draw on the power embedded in institutionalized 
accounting practices (the Uniform Accounting Systems and planning budgets). This 
refers to the second perspective of power.    
 
This use of power in our case organization is related to the issue of conflicting 
institutions. When organizations face conflicting extra-organizational institutional 
demands, how they should respond?  Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that organizations 
adopt inconsistent, even conflicting, practice to gain legitimacy. However, D’ Aunno et 
al. (1991) argue that organizations have limited ability to respond to conflicting 
institutional demands and thus will confirm to them only partially. Our case company 
faced such conflicting institutional demands from the holding company to implement the 
ERP system and the Central Agency for Accountability to use the Uniform Accounting 
System and planning budgets. As will be explained later, the company used the 
requirements of one institution to resist the requirement of the other.  
 
2.3 Institutional Pressures and Market and Competitive Pressures 
The early work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) de-emphasized the role of market and 
competitive pressures in influencing organizations and explaining organizational 
activities and practices. However, recent institutional studies have recognized this role 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Oliver, 1992; Powell, 1991; Scott, 1991) but have not 
agreed on the relation between institutional and market pressures. Some institutional 
studies argue that institutional and market pressures may be in opposition (e.g. Oliver, 
1992). So, gaining legitimacy is in conflict with achieving efficiency. This view is 
adopted by a few accounting scholars (e.g. Hoque and Hopper, 1997; Modell, 2002). 
Other institutional studies argue that both institutional and market pressures are exerted 
on organizations, which must respond to both pressures (e.g. Powell, 1991). This means 
that organizations can simultaneously demonstrate both institutional conformity and 
technical efficiency. There are a few examples of accounting studies adopting this view 
(e.g. Gupta et al., 1994; Hossain and Hoque, 2002; Tsamenyi et al., 2006). In this paper, 
we adopt the view that both institutional and market pressures may have negative effects 
on adopting efficient accounting systems when there is coercive isomorphism. This 
means that market pressures lose their positive role under greater levels of coercive 
pressures.  
 
In terms of the interplay between the institutional and market forces in Egypt, a 
comprehensive economic and structural adjustment programme funded by the World 
Bank and IMF was adopted in 1990s. This programme aimed to move the Egyptian 
economy from a state-controlled economy to a free market-oriented economy. As a result 
of this programme, a number of laws were enacted to establish competitive markets with 
freedom of entry and free market prices. For example, Egypt started to implement GATT 
Agreement. This resulted in removing the protection policy for local products by 
reducing or eliminating custom duties imposed on imported foreign products. In addition, 
the General Sales Tax and the Global Income Tax were enacted to replace tax laws that 
discriminated against foreign competition. Also, most of state-owned enterprises were 
privatised according to Law No. 203 of 1991. This law was designed to eliminate the 
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difference in treatment between public and private enterprises. In this paper, we examine 
how the interplay between institutional and market forces negatively affects the adoption 
of the ERP system in AML, our case organization.   
 
3. Research Method 
The case study method was used to obtain a rich set of data surrounding the specific 
research issues and to capture the contextual complexity (Yin, 1994). Case study 
materials were gathered during 2003-2004, and included semi-structured interviews 
carried out by one of the authors, site visits and the collection of documentary evidence 
spanning the life of the ERP project. To facilitate access to some confidential 
information, a formal written permission was obtained from the Central Agency for 
Public Mobilization and Statistics, the official source of providing and authorizing the 
collection of data from state-owned enterprises in Egypt.    
Semi-structured interviews were the main data collection method to find out what 
participants do, think or feel. The interviews were conducted with some members of the 
ERP project team (ERP sponsor, some key users and end users). These members included 
cost and financial accountants, IT staff and line-managers. Eight face-to-face interviews2 
were conducted. They lasted up to 2 hours. The ERP sponsor (the ex-CEO of the 
company) was interviewed twice to overcome the absence of the ERP project manager, 
who retired before conducting the interviews. Also, the extensive interviews carried out 
with other project team and documentary evidence were valuable in identifying the role 
of the ERP project manager in the ERP implementation process.         
In addition to the interviews, other data collection methods were used. These methods 
include background questionnaires, documentary evidence, direct observations, published 
accounts and budgets. These multiple methods are deliberately selected as one method 
can complement others. This triangulation tends to improve the validity of evidence 
(Scapens, 1990). In interpretive research the validity of evidence can be assessed only in 
the context of the particular case, what Scapens (1990) calls ‘contextual validity’. In this 
regard, Scapens (1990) suggests the triangulation of evidence by collecting different 
pieces of evidence on the same research issue, collecting other evidence from the same 
source and working in teams in order to reach an agreed interpretation of a particular 
case. As a consequence, the use of multiple sources of evidence in this case study is 
justifiable on the grounds of increasing the contextual validity of research evidence.  
The case study materials were collected from AML Company, previously known as 
NOUR Company, a state-owned company. AML Company was chosen because it 
demonstrates a failed attempt to customize an ERP system in a highly institutionalized 
environment (a state-owned company) in a developing country (Egypt). There is a lack of 
research on the impact of highly institutionalized environments on ERP implementations 
and the possible failure of ERP projects as a result of these circumstances. In addition, by 
comparison with previous research in developed countries research on ERP in developing 
                                                 
2 Interviews were not tape-recorded because the interviewees preferred to talk in a more confidential way.  
However, extensive notes were taken during the interviews. 
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countries can aid our understanding of the contextual and national differences on ERP 
implementations and their impact on adopting or rejecting accounting systems and 
practices built into the software (Huang and Palvia, 2001; El-Sayed and Westrup, 2003).  
There were some limitations associated with the case study reported in this paper. One 
limitation of this case study was the fact that the ERP project manager was not 
interviewed because she retired before conducting the interviews. Another limitation was 
that the case expressed the views of customer organization personnel not vendor 
organization staff. Also, there are some other limitations associated with the use of case 
study method in general such as the limited generalization of the findings of a single case 
study and the possibility of the researchers’ bias.  
 
4. Institutional Interpretation of ERP Customization Failure 
In this section we analyse the failure of ERP customization in AML. Based on the 
theoretical framework, we identify three separate, but related, reasons for this failure, 
knitting them together through the new institutional perspective of the paper. We first 
focus on coercive pressures exerted on AML from the regulatory environment and the 
holding company, as well as the intra-organizational power relations. Then, we address 
the impact of the interplay between institutional and market forces on AML.     
 
4.1 Institutionalised Accounting Practices as Sources of ERP Package-Organization 
Misalignments in AML 
The defining period of modern Egypt is still the revolutionary socialist regime under 
President Nasser (1952-1970). After the revolution of 1952, the Egyptian Government 
made a break with the past and moved the Egyptian economy from a free market-oriented 
economy to a massively state-controlled economy in few years. The nationalisation laws 
and expropriation of various private enterprises became the expression of change in 
Egypt after the July Revolution in 1952. A series of nationalisation decrees was issued in 
1956, 1961, and 1963 to eliminate the dominant role of both foreign and large-scale, local 
private capital. In 1952, the private sector made about 76% of the total investment in the 
economy. The public sector very quickly established its dominance in the economy and 
for the next three decades was making between 80-90% of the investment in the economy 
and constituted around 37% of GDP annually (PCSU, 2002).  
 
In view of the state’s dependence on accounting information to prepare the National Plan, 
the Uniform Accounting System was introduced by the Central Agency for Accountancy3 
in 1966. It was compulsory for all State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the public sector, 
with the exception of banks and insurance companies. In such accounting system, 
accounts are classified in homogeneous classes in a manner that assists in preparing 
national accounts, as well as satisfying the needs of the traditional financial and cost 
accounting4.  
 
                                                 
3 The Central Agency for Accountability is a control authority that reports to the Egyptian People’s 
Assembly on the performance of all state-owned enterprises and government ministries and agencies.  
4 For more details about the Uniform Accounting System, see, for example, Briston and El-Ashker (1984). 
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NOUR Company, currently known as AML, is one of the companies that were subject to 
partial nationalization. NOUR Company5, a leading international company in the 
electronics industry based in the Netherlands, established its branch in Egypt under the 
name of ‘NOUR-orient’ in 1930. Initially, the activities of the NOUR branch in Egypt 
were just importing and marketing some electrical finished products such as televisions, 
refrigerators and light bulbs. In 1944, the local production of these electrical products 
was launched for the first time. In the 1960s, the Egyptian branch of NOUR was 50% 
nationalised by the Egyptian Government and by Law No. 118 of 1961, it became a 50% 
public sector company. However, its products continued to have the brand name of 
‘NOUR’.  
 
As a state-owned enterprise, the company has applied the Uniform Accounting System to 
serve both financial accounting and cost accounting since 1966. It also prepares 
traditional planning budgets such as a sales budget, a production budget and a commodity 
and service requirements budget. The Dutch partner had not affected the accounting 
system used. However, reports prepared were affected. Certain reports were requested to 
be prepared by the Finance Department. These reports were specially designed to satisfy 
the Dutch partner’s needs. The use of the Uniform Accounting System and planning 
budgets in AML has been routinized and institutionalised. They became part of day-to-
day life and the way of doing things (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Accountants use the 
account codes as a way of communication with other organizational members in day-to-
day interactions. 
In Soh and Sia’s (2004) terms, the Uniform Accounting System and planning budgets are 
imposed organisational structures. They are imposed and monitored by the coercive 
authority of the state agencies (the Central Agency for Accountancy). Soh and Sia (2004) 
argue that where the misalignment between embedded structures in ERP packages and 
organizations arises from an imposed structure, the decision will usually be to modify the 
ERP packages to support the existing institutional structure. This is because the 
organization is usually unable to change government regulations. Modifying the ERP 
package was the action taken by AML. However, ERP customization failed to solve the 
misfit problem and led to the failure of the ERP project in AML.  
The Financial Accounts Department and the Budgeting and Costing Department insisted 
that the Uniform Accounting System had to be built into the ERP software and the 
reports must be prepared in the same normal format. MIS General Manager explained: 
Customisation was the main reason for ERP failure. Finance Department is required to apply the 
Uniform Accounting System. This system is like the constitution. It has to be followed. 
Accountants have certain reports that have to be prepared…We were extremely inflexible and we 
have not had an ability to change business processes. 
The General Manager of Planning gave an example of the inflexibility of accountants: 
                                                 
5 The real name is disguised. 
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If we used the software as it is, we would complete the project. This would solve a lot of 
problems. A lot of modifications and customisations were done. There was no flexibility on the 
part of accountants at all. They even insisted on using four decimal numbers as they did 
manually… They wanted the ERP to be customised to reflect the Uniform Accounting System. It 
took a lot of efforts to customise the ERP to be in conformity with the Uniform Accounting 
System…The same document should be prepared by the ERP system as the manual document. 
Otherwise, the software was not suitable. 
For example, the Uniform Accounting System dictates the account chart in terms of eight 
digit numbers. It took two months to customize the ERP system to accept the account 
chart. However, the ERP system required changing the documents, procedures and 
documentary cycles between the company’s departments. Accountants rejected this type 
of change as it contradicted existing routines and institutions. The General Manager of 
Financial Accounts gave the following reason: 
We found that we should prepare and change the documentary cycles to fit the ERP system before 
starting to implement it. There are control authorities that accepted and recognised the procedures 
a lot of years ago. So it was difficult to replace and change these procedures. 
He added: 
I cannot violate the rules of the Uniform Accounting System. The Central Agency for 
Accountability audits our compliance with these rules and disagrees with any differences. I cannot 
violate the rules in order to adopt the ERP system. There will be legal responsibility. If the ERP 
Company were able to customise the ERP system to be in conformity with the Uniform 
Accounting System the ERP system would operate. 
Furthermore, the division of one invoice into a number of screens led to difficulty in 
using the ERP system in AML. There were a lot of documents that were difficult to be 
entered into the ERP system using the screens designed in the system. The division of a 
single document into a lot of screens was seen by accountants as impossible. For 
instance, there were six screens to record the fixed assets’ depreciation. The General 
Manager for Financial Accounts explained: 
Any system opens a single screen that leads to other screens. However, in BAAN, if I have not 
entered a screen, the system would not accept the others… We prepare depreciation reserve for 
fully depreciated assets in books. This reserve requires re-evaluation of assets. For two years, we 
were unable to customise the ERP system to record this reserve. To prepare a compound entry 
(from two or more accounts to two or more accounts), the system required using intermediate 
accounts. The system consumed our time in preparing intermediate accounts and entries without 
any necessity.  
Accordingly, there were tensions in the process of customizing the ERP package to be in 
conformity with existing institutions, rules and routines. According to Burns and Scapens 
(2000: 16 & 17), it is likely to be much easier to introduce changes that do not challenge 
existing ways of thinking and norms of behavior. However, a change that conflicts with 
existing routines and institutions is likely to be much difficult to implement. In AML, the 
embedded structures in the ERP system were incompatible with the established ways of 
thinking and norms of behavior embedded in the existing routines and institutions, 
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especially the Uniform Accounting System. The General Manager of Financial Accounts 
pointed out: 
The BAAN system was not suitable for the nature of our business and our work systems. Would 
we change the state systems such…the Uniform Accounting System in order to implement the 
BAAN system?   
He added: 
The ERP offered solutions but they were not suitable for us. The software is not suitable for the 
Egyptian environment. It might be useful for Europe. There was a will to make the ERP system 
succeeds; however, the system was not in conformity with our systems. The problem was that it 
was non-customisable software. It was inflexible software like a train has to be pulled alone a 
railway line. Tailored (custom-developed) systems would satisfy our needs. 
A cost accountant agreed with the above comment: 
The user needs for financial data… should be determined and satisfied. The computerised system 
should be tailored rather than imposed as a software package. 
He continued: 
There were a lot of difficulties in implementing BAAN software. This system is not suitable for 
our reality, our life and our systems that we are used to use. The software does not satisfy our 
needs. I personally prefer custom software to packaged software. 
In sum, ERP consultants tried to customize the software. However, the software has 
challenged established accounting rules and routines. It contradicted the Uniform 
Accounting System, which has been used by public sector enterprises since 1966 and 
continually monitored by the Central Agency for Accountability during the customization 
process. This conclusion is consistent with Soh and Sia (2004) that when there is a 
misalignment between imposed organizational structures and embedded structures in 
ERP packages, it is difficult to change the government regulations and the ERP packages 
have to be modified to support the existing institutional structures. Sometimes, the 
customization process is difficult to implement and the ERP project will fail. This was 
what happened in the AML case.     
4.2 The Holding Company as a Conflicting Institution and Intra-Organizational Power 
Relations 
In the early 1990s, a privatisation programme was undertaken because of the  
Government of Egypt’s (GOE) dissatisfaction with the failure and loses of public sector 
enterprises and the external pressures from international donors (World Bank and IMF) in 
favour of privatisation. The GOE launched the privatisation programme with the Public 
Enterprise Law No. 203 of 1991 and its regulations, establishing the legal framework for 
sale of 314 public enterprises that earmarked for privatisation. This law marked the start 
of public enterprise reform. It was designed to eliminate the difference in treatment 
between public and private enterprises. 
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Public holding companies were established in 1991. The ownership and management of 
314 public enterprises, subjected to Law 203 of 1991, were transferred from the various 
ministries to 17 holding companies, which are held accountable to the Ministry of Public 
Enterprises. Holding companies are primarily responsible for organising the sale of their 
constituent SOEs known as affiliated companies, with a mandate to maximise the present 
value of their affiliated companies on behalf of the state.  
According to Law No. 203 of 1991, the ownership and management of the Government’s 
share in NOUR Company were transferred to the Holding Company for Engineering 
Industries to organise its sale. In December 1997, the Egyptian Government tried to 
privatise the company by selling it to the Dutch company, NOUR. However, negotiations 
failed and the Egyptian Government decided to buy the share of the Dutch partner. The 
company’s name was changed to AML, which became a 100% public sector company. 
Furthermore, AML Company reduced its activities to the manufacturing and marketing of 
lamps. The General Manager for Budgeting and Costing described this situation as 
follows: 
During the negotiations on selling the company at the end of 1997, it was re-evaluated. NOUR 
Company assessed that its brand name was worth 60% of the company’s value and was willing to 
pay the Government the remaining value. However, the Egyptian side rejected this deal and 
bought the Dutch partner’s share. A new brand name, ‘AML’, was introduced.  
As a result of the privatization, there was some change in the institutions governing the 
public sector such as the introduction of Law No. 203 of 1991 and the holding 
companies. However, the old institutions such as the Central Agency for Accountability 
continued to govern the public sector as well. Following the failure of privatisation 
process of AML Company, the company is still applying the Uniform Accounting 
System and planning budgets that are monitored by the Central Agency for Accountancy. 
Also, the company has to obey the orders of the Holding Company for Engineering 
Industries. This situation created conflicting institutions. Organizational members in 
AML used one institution (the requirements of the Central Agency for Accountability) to 
resist the other (the requirements of the holding company).  
 
The decision to implement an ERP system at AML was related to its privatization attempt 
at the end of 1997. Following the withdrawal of NOUR Company, a decision to adopt an 
ERP system in AML was mainly taken by the Egyptian Holding Company for 
Engineering Industries, which started implementing an ERP system at the same time. The 
General Manager of the MIS Department described this decision as follows: 
The ERP project came as a compulsory order from the holding company. It has not expressed our 
needs. We have not initiated this project. As a decision-maker, you are not able to make a 
decision… People, I mean financial accountants and cost accountants, rejected the project. They 
have not co-operated with the top management in implementing the project as they felt that it was 
imposed on them and they were not in need for it…The holding company itself failed to 
implement the ERP software.   
The General Manager of Planning emphasized this fact by saying: 
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The ERP project was a recommendation from the holding company to implement a good 
information system. The objective was the existence of a common integrated database for the 
whole company to facilitate communications and the availability of information to decision-
makers in real time. However, I think that because there was a complete collapse in the company, 
the ERP project failed… The holding company wanted to modernise information systems. It 
implemented the same system and failed. 
The General Manager of Planning described the feelings of employees towards the ERP 
by saying ‘people (accountants) resisted the ERP system and implemented it against their 
will. It was like doing your job without liking it’. So, ERP was perceived as a major 
threat to the survival of the organization as a whole and its constituent organizational 
members. The General Manager of Planning commented that ‘there was a fear from 
privatization. Would we stay working in the company or would we leave the company?’ 
Thus, AML’s organizational members challenged the holding company’s decision to 
implement BAAN software. They resisted ERP implementation as they felt that this 
software was a threat to the existence of the company as a whole and to their secured 
jobs. The General Manager of Financial Accounts added ‘the number of employees has 
been reduced because of early retirement’6. The use of the ERP system would accelerate 
the retirement process as it would require skills that are not available in the existing 
employees. Furthermore, the failure of ERP implementation in the holding company 
legitimized the failure of the same ERP package in AML. The ERP failure in AML 
became a logical outcome and self-explained result as a result of its failure in the holding 
company. 
According to Burns and Scapens (2000), if those responsible for implementing the new 
system possess sufficient power, they may be able to impose change, albeit with some 
difficulty. However, if other key individuals or groups have sufficient power, they may 
be able to resist or subvert the change process. That was what happened in AML. The 
holding company and top management wanted to make AML attractive to investors by 
imposing the ERP project. For that reason, the ERP caused a lot of anxiety as it was seen 
as a necessary step towards privatization and, subsequently, early retirement. To prevent 
this from happening, other organizational members, especially accountants, resisted the 
ERP project through their control of resources7 required in the implementation process. 
Accountants used their knowledge with the requirements of the Uniform Accounting 
System as a way to resist the ERP implementation. Burns and Scapens (2000: 10) state 
that ‘…[institutionalized] routines may become somewhat resistant to change’. And in 
another instance, they state ‘…the power embedded in the institutionalized routines, 
which shape the actions and thoughts of members of the organizations…’ (p. 23). 
Institutionalized routines such as the requirements of the Uniform Accounting System 
provide accountants with sufficient power to resist the implementation of the ERP 
project.   
                                                 
6 In the planning budgets for 1998/99, the number of employees was 3630 on 31/12/1997. This number was 
planned to be reduced to 3360 employees due to the use of early retirement policy.  
7 The exercise of power in social relations depends on both formal sources (hierarchy of authority and 
responsibility) and informal sources (knowledge, mobilization of authority, experience, significance of 
the institution, personal relations or connections with power holders).  
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These findings provide a possible answer to the question of ‘how organizations respond 
to new extra-organizational institutional demands that conflict with their traditional 
practices?’ Our case company used one institutional demand to resist the other because 
both the holding company and AML have to comply with the requirements of the Central 
Agency for Accountability. They cannot violate these requirements. These findings differ 
from other observed responses in previous studies (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; D’ Aunno et 
al. 1991).    
 
4.3 Market and Competitive Pressures 
In the 1990s the changes in the regulatory environment in Egypt created market and 
competitive pressures on AML. The privatization programme launched by Law No. 203 
of 1991 and the implementation of the GATT agreement opened up the Egyptian market 
and created fierce competition. This competition adversely affected AML. As a result of 
competition, AML suffered severe successive losses from 1997 to present. For example, 
reported losses in 1996/97 were 5,563,000 Egyptian pounds. 
 
On the one hand, according to the Public Enterprise Law No. 203 of 1991 and its 
regulations, there was a failed attempt to privatise AML in 1997. This attempt led to the 
withdrawal of the Dutch Company, NOUR. The withdrawal of NOUR led to changing 
the company’s brand name from ‘NOUR’ to ‘AML’. Customers did not know the new 
brand name and they did not differentiate it from other available brands in the Egyptian 
market. Furthermore, some of the company’s machines left by NOUR were outdated and 
in bad condition. This means that the use of these old machines increased the occurrence 
of defective products and hence ‘quality costs’ such as the costs of scrap, spoilage and 
negative goodwill. 
On the other hand, as a direct impact of the implementation of the GATT agreement in 
Egypt in the 1990s8, a lot of rival light bulbs have been imported and sold in the Egyptian 
market at a much lower price, normally less than the product costs. A cost accountant 
said: 
The GATT agreement has led to the entrance of a lot of imported products, including light bulbs, 
to the Egyptian market, especially from China. This resulted in fierce competition and difficulties 
in competing with these products. For example, there is currently a dumping process, where 
products are sold with prices less than their costs. As a result, the local product cannot be sold. 
The General Manager of Budgeting and Cost Accounting Department confirmed this fact 
when saying: 
The company won a legal case against a company to stop cheap imported light bulbs being 
dumped in the Egyptian market. 
                                                 
8 In the planning budgets for 1998/99, the custom duties on imported light bulbs were reduced from 70% to 
45%. In addition, the company continued the production reduction policy followed in 1996/97 and in 
1997/98 as a result of the fierce competition caused by removing protection policy for local products and 
dumping processes.   
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In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s facilitated importing 
complete light bulbs factories on a large scale from former Soviet Union countries. The 
phenomenon known as ‘downstairs factories’ started to emerge. These factories, managed 
by unknown producers, started to compete with AML by manufacturing and selling a 
diversity of cheap untested rival light bulbs. A cost accountant explained: 
The Soviet Union Collapse was a major source of the emergence of unknown small producers. 
AML was unable to compete with those producers because they have small factories and few staff 
and produce their products with low costs.  
Due to all the above unfavorable competitive circumstances, AML has lost most of its 
market share. Because of the marketing problems of AML’s products, the company 
started producing and inventorying lamps in order to continue running and to find work 
for the company’s workers. However, the ERP system did not support the policy of 
production for inventory and would increase the visibility of this policy. The General 
Manager of Financial Accounts Department described this problem as follows: 
At the end of each year, we need to increase production either to reduce losses or to make use of 
available materials and workforce. Therefore, we produce to put our production in warehouses 
until we can find an opportunity for sale. But that was not available in the BAAN system. The 
BAAN system did not recognise the production for inventory purpose but only production without 
inventory. This was an obstacle to implementing the ERP system in the Production Planning 
Department.  
So the ERP system was perceived as not supporting the only available policy for the 
company's survival, which is the production for inventory purpose. Furthermore, the ERP 
project increased the degree of financial crisis in AML. The cost of BAAN software was 
very high. So it was difficult for the company to recover the cost of this software, taking 
into account the previously mentioned circumstances9. However, AML was not been 
declared insolvent because there is no notion of bankruptcy in the public sector. To avoid 
the legal liability of canceling the ERP purchase contract and to regain control over this 
crisis situation, the company transferred the reason for ERP failure to the ERP vendor. 
The argument was that the ERP vendor failed to customize the software to satisfy the 
company’s needs. The General Manager for Planning Department explained this fact as 
follows: 
There was a fear of legal responsibility from control agencies such as the Central Agency for 
Accountability. I rejected responsibility for the ERP project. After three years, it was found that 
the sound solution was to stop the project…It was decided to stop the project at this point… We 
stopped and liquidated the guarantee letter. For three years the Central Agency for Accountability 
was asking us. We stopped it (the ERP project). It was a fear rather than anything else. The ERP 
vendor in Saudi Arabia has been charged all costs. It was a high cost.    
                                                 
9 The company expanded the use of overdraft loans from local and international banks to finance its 
operations. In the planning budgets for 1998/99, local overdraft loans on 30/06/1997 were L.E. 
27,793,000 (total assets were L.E. 249,327,000). These loans were expected to become L.E. 40,000,000 
in 1998/99 (total assets were L.E. 269,027,000). 
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The competitive market forces interacted with the institutional environment to shape the 
failure of the ERP project. The introduction of the ERP was a coercive pressure exerted 
by the holding company. However, the holding company did not support AML 
financially to purchase and implement the ERP project. To fund the ERP project AML 
had to use its own resources. But the market pressures led to continuous losses. So AML 
could not afford the cost of the ERP software. The organizational members resisted the 
pressure of the holding company and unfavorable market conditions by citing the uniform 
accounting practices imposed by the regulatory authority for accounting, the Central 
Agency for Accountability. The inability of the ERP system to meet the requirements of 
these authorities was the explicit reason citied for the failure to embed ERP in the 
organisation.  On this way, the externally imposed institutional requirements were used to 
resist both other institutional pressures and market and competitive pressures.   
 
These findings support the view that under conditions of heightened coercive pressures, 
accounting systems can become decoupled from day-to-day operations (Modell, 2002). In 
addition the paper has demonstrated that in this highly regulated economic and political 
environment, market and competitive pressures also inhibited the adoption of new, 
supposedly efficient, accounting systems. These findings contradict those of Hoque and 
Hopper (1997), who found that when managers face both high market competition and 
strong political and industrial relations turbulence, the market competition tend to have 
positive effects on their use of accounting information and strong political and industrial 
relations turbulence tend to have negative effects.     
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to interpret and understand the failure to embed the technology 
of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) in an Egyptian state-owned company (AML).  
The paper draws on new institutional sociology and its extensions as the theoretical 
framework for interpreting this failure.  It explains ERP customization failure in terms of 
the interplay between institutional pressures, institutionalised accounting practices, 
conflicting institutions, intra-organizational power relations, and market forces. The 
findings revealed that the inability of the ERP system to meet the core accounting 
requirements of the control authorities (the Central Agency for Accountability) was the 
explicit reason cited by organizational actors for the failure to embed ERP in the 
company.  In addition, the externally imposed requirements for a Uniform Accounting 
System and planning budgets were used to resist both other institutional pressures (the 
Holding Company for Engineering Industries) and market and competitive pressures. 
 
The findings of the case study presented in this paper contribute to the literature 
addressing ERP and accounting stability (Granlund, 2001, Granlund and Malmi, 2002; 
Spathis and Constantinides, 2002; Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003; Quattrone and Hopper, 
2005). The accounting stability in this paper was an outcome and a reason for the ERP 
customization failure. The results of the case study are consistent with Granlund (2001) 
who described the introduction of an ERP system and the resistance that followed its 
implementation. He explained this resistance as adherence to earlier procedures, i.e. 
routines.  
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This research also supports the findings of Burns (2000) that the existing institutional 
context acted as a barrier against change. Similarly, Scapens and Jazayeri (2003) found 
that companies tended to replace existing accounting systems with other very similar 
systems. Also, in one of two organizations studied, Quattrone and Hopper (2005) found 
that the ERP reproduced existing structures and distance which permitted conventional 
accounting controls to be maintained. This paper extends this literature by studying the 
introduction of ERP in a company in Egypt (a less developed country), focusing on the 
problem of misfits, and identifying additional factors, specifically the impact of 
regulatory agencies and competitive market forces, that contribute to the failure of ERP.   
 
Furthermore, the paper also makes a contribution to the accounting literature on 
developing and transitional economies by specifically confronting the question of 
whether uniform systems of accounting technology, such as ERP or activity-based 
costing, can be successfully introduced in countries with very different cultures and 
economic and political structures.   
 
Finally, there are several implications for future accounting research.  The institutional 
framework can be applied to other problems in management accounting, for example the 
introduction of new budgetary control systems. This framework is based on analysing the 
interplay between institutional pressures, institutionalised accounting practices, 
conflicting institutions, intra-organizational power relations, and market forces. The use 
of such extended institutional analysis contributes to recent calls to broaden NIS (Oliver, 
1992; Modell, 2002; Dillard et al., 2004; Tsamenyi et al., 2006). The proposed 
framework is valuable in explaining the origins of the problem of misfits and how to 
solve or exaggerate this problem. This problem has been observed in both developed 
(Scapens et al., 1998: 48) and developing countries (Soh et al., 2000: 48).          
 
Additional case studies of ERP and accounting in other developing and transitional 
economies, perhaps with very different cultures and political structures, would test the 
reliability of the conclusions of this study.  Imported information (and accounting) 
systems face a lot of difficulties in developing countries (e.g. Mensah, 1981; Ndubizu, 
1984; Hove, 1989; Wallace, 1993; Larson and Kenny, 1995; Longden et al., 2001).  It is 
assumed that organisations in different countries introducing ERP systems face similar 
difficulties and challenges as a consequence of the ERP package-organization 
misalignments identified in this paper. However, new case studies should explore similar 
or other difficulties and challenges facing companies working in developing countries 
when trying to implement imported advanced information technologies such as ERP 
systems. 
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